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Abstract
We examine optimal taxation and social insurance if insurance mar-
kets are imperfect. This requires the development of a theory of labor
supply under uncertainty. We show that the case for social insurance
is not generally reinforced by adverse selection in insurance markets
as social insurance will have welfare-decreasing e￿ects on the labor
market. Furthermore, positive and normative implications are highly
sensitive to the insurance market equilibrium concept. While for the
Rothschild-Stiglitz case social insurance at least alleviates the ine￿-
ciency of underinsurance, with a Wilson pooling equilibrium this inef-
￿ciency might even be worsened by social insurance. This sheds new
light on the question whether social insurance is an appropriate means
of redistribution in the presence of an optimally chosen tax schedule.
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1 Introduction
It is known since the seminal work of Mirrlees (1971) that the problem of
taxation is fundamentally linked to asymmetric information between govern-
ment and workers. Only with the reasonable assumption that the government
cannot observe individual productivities does the need for income taxation
that distorts labor supply arise. The no less in￿uential contributions of Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) have shown that a similar issue
makes the problem of equilibrium in insurance markets a relevant question.
If insurance companies cannot observe individual risk types, they are unable
to o￿er individually tailored contracts but have to take into account the pos-
sibility of mimicking. Under these circumstances, the market allocation will
not in general be e￿cient.
It is all the more surprising that up to date there is no satisfactory theory
that ties those two branches of information economics together. This lack
of a unifying theory is particularly astonishing in the light of the fact that
taxation and insurance are highly relevant policy matters. With the present
contribution, we try to provide such a theory and to highlight important as-
pects of the interaction between distorting taxation and imperfect insurance
markets.
The link between the two strands is a theory of precautionary labor that
we develop in section 2. While the theory of optimal income taxation requires
labor supply to be endogenous, models of competitive insurance markets with
adverse selection imply that not all uncertainty can be resolved. To combine
both approaches, we therefore need to derive the determinants of labor supply
under uncertainty. Our model is based on the results of Kimball (1990). We
show that under a broad range of reasonable assumptions, a precautionary
labor supply motive exists, i.e. that the introduction of uncertainty leads
individuals to increase their labor supply.
We then incorporate this theory into a model of optimal linear taxation
and social insurance similar in spirit to Rochet (1991), Cremer and Pestieau
(1996) and Henriet and Rochet (2004). Even without an explicit theory of
insurance markets we can show how market imperfections alter the optimality
conditions for taxes and transfers. We also prove that, contrary to a ￿rst
intuitive notion, market imperfections do not generally reinforce the case for
social insurance but might even weaken it.Labor Supply under Uncertainty 2
In section 4 we endogenize the insurance market in the developed frame-
work, which requires a modi￿cation of the standard theory to allow for en-
dogenous labor supply. This closes the model as it makes it possible to
demonstrate all interaction e￿ects between taxation, social insurance, and
private insurance markets. Several insights can be drawn from this approach.
Most importantly, the positive and normative results are highly sensitive to
the underlying equilibrium concept. Social insurance will generally alleviate
the ine￿ciency of underinsurance in the Rothschild-Stiglitz framework but
might have strong negative e￿ects on the labor market. A complete renun-
ciation of social insurance hence might be optimal. If equilibrium is of the
Wilson pooling type, social insurance might even worsen the ine￿ciency in
the insurance market.
The most similar existing work is the contribution by Boadway, Leite-
Monteiro, Marchand, and Pestieau (2004) who were the ￿rst to examine
optimal taxation with adverse selection and ex-post moral hazard in pri-
vate insurance markets.1 Based on Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibria
they ￿nd the case for social insurance strengthened by market ine￿ciencies. 2
However, their results are based on the assumption that labor supply de-
cisions take place after a possible damage has been realized. This reduces
the impact of underinsurance on individual decisions to income e￿ects and
admittedly makes it di￿cult to interpret and sign the resulting optimality
conditions. We do not want to eliminate the question of labor supply under
uncertainty, which we believe to play a decisive role in the understanding of
the interaction between taxation and insurance.
2 Labor Supply under Uncertainty
Some prerequisite results concerning individuals’ labor supply under uncer-
tainty have to be derived ￿rst. This is done by transferring the results of
Kimball (1990) to labor supply in order to establish a theory of ‘precau-
tionary labor’. While the theory of precautionary savings has received some
attention (Sandmo (1970), Abel (1988), Kimball (1990)), to our knowledge
there is no elaborate theory of precautionary labor supply. Eaton and Rosen
1We refrain from analyzing moral hazard. Other aspects of our model setup are very
similar to Boadway, Leite-Monteiro, Marchand, and Pestieau (2004).
2‘The introduction of adverse selection has the e￿ect of fostering social insurance.’ (p.
20)Labor Supply under Uncertainty 3
(1979) and Eaton and Rosen (1980) examine the case of endogenous labor
with wage uncertainty. However, they mostly present only simulation results.
Unlike them, we do not model wage risk but an income independent risk to
consumption. Labor supply is chosen before the risk is realized. This gives
rise to the question whether risk induces people to work more or less than
they would in case of certainty.
Let ~ µ1 denote a random variable with expectation zero and variance¾2
1.
The assumption of zero expectation will be relaxed later. The random vari-
able ~ µ2 is assumed to have the same expectation but a higher variance ¾2
2.
Furthermore, as throughout the paper, an additively separable utility func-
tion U(c;L) = u(c) + v(L) is assumed, where c denotes consumption and
L denotes labor supply.3 The standard conditions u0(c) > 0, u00(c) < 0,
v0(L) < 0 and v00(L) < 0 hold. Denote the productivity of an individual by
w. Firms can observe w and pay wages according to marginal productiv-
ity such that earned income is wL. The individual is assumed to have an
additional, exogenous and state independent incomeT.
The ￿rst order condition for labor supplyL¤(~ µ1) that maximizes expected












where E is the expectations operator. (1) is a standard condition stating
that labor supply is determined as to equalize expected marginal utility and
disutility from work. The su￿cient second order condition for a maximum is
ful￿lled. How does risk a￿ect the ￿rst order condition? First, optimal labor
supply in a situation with the higher risk ~ µ2 would be equal to L¤(~ µ1) if ex-
pected consumption was higher by thecompensating precautionary premium















¤ + T ¡ ~ µ2 + ª
¤(~ µ1; ~ µ2)
´i
: (2)
In that case, the optimality condition (1) would not be a￿ected. The com-
pensating precautionary premium will be extremely helpful for modelling
3We need the assumption of separability only to keep the exposition of our labor supply
theory concise. As shown by Kimball (1990), the results can be transferred to the case
of nonseparable utility. In the later sections, separability is not necessary either but only
used since we resort to the theory of labor supply under uncertainty there. Note ￿nally
that the function v has to be at least twice, u at least three times di￿erentiable.Labor Supply under Uncertainty 4
adverse selection in insurance markets with endogenous labor supply.
Correspondingly, the equivalent precautionary premium ª(~ µ1; ~ µ2) at labor















¤ + T ¡ ~ µ2
´i
: (3)
Its interpretation is as follows. An increase in risk from ~ µ1 to ~ µ2 will have the
same e￿ect on labor supply as a lump-sum reduction of income byª(~ µ1; ~ µ2),
since it a￿ects the optimality condition (1) in the same way. Therefore,
statements about the adjustment of labor supply provoked by a change of
risk can be reduced to statements about the income e￿ect provoked by a
decrease of income by ª. Note that ª¤ and ª become the same if the change
in risk becomes arbitrarily small.
As shown by Kimball (1990), the discussed premiums are simply the
compensating and equivalent risk premia developed by Pratt (1964), applied
to the ￿rst derivative of u. Therefore, the following relationship holds for
the introduction of a small risk ¾2























2) denotes a term that is of smaller magnitude than¾2
2 and ´ is the
absolute prudence of the function u.4
From equation (4) follow some ￿rst implications for the theory of behavior
under risk. If ´ is positive, the introduction of risk will have the same e￿ect
on labor supply as a lump sum reduction of income, which decreases the
demand for leisure5 and increases labor supply; the individual has a motive
for precautionary labor. The size of ´ indicates how strong this motive is.
As shown in Appendix A, a positive prudence is a necessary condition for
constant or decreasing risk aversion, both in absolute and relative terms.
Therefore, under the common and realistic assumption of non-increasing risk
aversion, precautionary labor e￿ects do exist.
So far, the results were derived for the introduction of small risks with
expectation zero, starting from a point of certain income. They can be
4The proof for this relationship follows from a Taylor series expansion ofu0(wL¤ + T)
around wL¤ + T and is omitted here. Refer for example to Pratt (1964), p. 125.
5Our assumption of separable preferences implies that leisure is a normal good.Labor Supply under Uncertainty 5
generalized to cases of risk with nonzero expectation. Changes in risk then
simply entail additional income e￿ects. It is still useful to distinguish between
pure risk e￿ects via the variance and income e￿ects via expected values. The
results can also be generalized to cases of initially risky situations (¾2
1 > 0), as
long as the prudence does not change its sign over a relevant range of income
levels.6 This is shown in Appendix B, where we assume that a damage of
size (1¡¯)D occurs with probability p. The parameter ¯ 2 [0;1], which can
be thought of as the share of risk that is insured, is used to vary the size
of the possible damage.7 It de￿nes a Bernoulli random variable ~ µ(¯) with
expectation p(1¡¯)D and variance ¾2(¯) = p(1¡p)[(1¡¯)D]2. Increasing
¯ reduces both variance and expected value. Appendix B illustrates that the












where @L¤=@T denotes the income e￿ect, which is negative. First, higher
coverage increases expected income by pD. Second, the change in variance
has the same e￿ect as a decrease of income by the corresponding premium
ª that is raised by an increased insurance coverage ¯. A general formula
for @ª=@¯ can be derived for all levels of ¯ and therefore for situations with
preexisting risk. It simpli￿es to the derivative of (4) with respect to ¯ for
the special case of ¯ = 1. A su￿cient condition for @ª=@¯ to be negative at
any initial value of ¯ is that the prudence is positive (and vice versa) on the
interval of consumption levels spanned by consumption in case of damage
and no damage.8 In that case, reduced variance through higher insurance
coverage reduces labor supply since it acts like an increase in income.
Finally, the marginal e￿ect (5) can be integrated so that the relation be-
tween prudence and precautionary labor motives remains qualitatively valid
for large changes in risk.
6For a detailed discussion of ’preexisting risk’ and its implication for the applicability
of standard measures of risk aversion see Ross (1981).
7For ease of presentation, no insurance premiums are modelled at this point, as they
would simply cause additional income e￿ects.
8This in turn is ful￿lled if the prudence is positive for all consumption levels, which
will be the case if risk-aversion is never increasing.Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance 6
3 Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance
3.1 The Model
This section introduces the basic model and derives conditions for optimal
taxation and social insurance in the presence of imperfect insurance mar-
kets. This is done without an explicit foundation of the market imperfec-
tion. Such questions are postponed to the next section. It will turn out
that di￿erent concepts explaining imperfection can easily be incorporated.
The model structure is similar to Cremer and Pestieau (1996) and Boadway,
Leite-Monteiro, Marchand, and Pestieau (2004).
Assume that society consists of N individuals that can be described by
two characteristics: their productivity and their probability of experiencing
some damage of size D. There are W di￿erent productivity levels wi; i =
1;:::;W and two damage probabilities pj; j = L;H, with pL < pH. In what
follows, the index i will always refer to productivity whilej refers to damage
probability.
Of all workers in productivity class i, miL individuals have the low prob-
ability pL of damage while miH are high risk types with damage probability
pH. The overall number of individuals in classi is therefore mi = miL +miH
and the size of the whole population isN =
PW
i=1 mi. Denote the proportion
of individuals in the population that have productivitywi and damage prob-
ability pj by nij = mij=N. The population average of the risk probability is
then given by ¹ p =
P
i;j nijpj. The average probability within productivity
group i is ¹ pi = (1=mi)
P
j mijpj.
As commonly assumed in the theory of optimal taxation, government
maximizes the unweighted utilitarian objective. 9 It can neither observe in-
dividual productivities nor damage probabilities10 but only knows the joint
distribution of both characteristics. Hours worked are assumed to be unob-
9Introducing individual weights in the welfare function would not fundamentally change
the following results. It would simply induce additional weights on the ’social valuation’
to be de￿ned below. Doing this would allow to construct the whole second-best Pareto
frontier.
10As long as the ratio miL=miH is not exactly the same in each productivity class,
observing damage probability would make some inference about productivity possible.
The assumption that damage probabilities are not observable excludes this possibility for
government. In addition, if probabilities were observable, there would be no case for social
insurance since income taxation could be directly conditioned on risk as was shown by
Boadway, Leite-Monteiro, Marchand, and Pestieau (2004).Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance 7
servable as well, so that distorting taxation of labor income is necessary to
redistribute income. The tax schedule is restricted to a constant marginal
tax rate ¿ and a lump-sum transfer T. Additionally, government can force
the citizens to insure a share® of the possible damage. Such social insurance
is ￿nanced by a uniform contribution ¹ p®D by each individual, which ensures
that social insurance makes zero pro￿ts in expectation. 11 Remaining risk can
be insured privately. The contract that individual ij purchases is denoted
by Iij = (¯ij;dij), where ¯ij is the privately insured share of the damage and
dij is the premium.
The time structure of the model is as follows. First, government sets its
policy P = (¿;T;®). Taking P as given, individuals simultaneously choose
their labor supply, pay taxes and social insurance contributions, receive the
transfer, and purchase the contractIij. Finally, the damage occurs according
to the given probabilities. After possible payments of social and private
insurance, consumption takes place.
3.2 Optimal Government Policy
As we will argue in section 4, each individual receives a ￿nite set of private
insurance contract o￿ers from which it chooses the one that yields the high-
est expected utility. Since labor supply and the purchase of insurance take
place simultaneously, the comparison of di￿erent contracts involves optimal
adjustment of labor supply.12 Each individual’s choice Iij is therefore the re-
sult of a noncontinuous optimization problem. GivenIij, the corresponding
optimal labor supply L¤
ij(¿;T;®;¯ij;dij) can be determined. It is de￿ned by
the ￿rst order condition
pj u0 ¡
(1 ¡ ¿)wiL¤
ij + T ¡ p®D ¡ dij ¡ (1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯ij)D
¢
+(1 ¡ pj)u0 ¡
(1 ¡ ¿)wiL¤





Implicit di￿erentiation of condition (6) yields comparative static e￿ects. Note
that the derivative of L¤
ij with respect to ® includes the e￿ect of the increase
11Funding of social insurance through the general budget and therefore the distorting
tax ¿ does not lead to di￿erent results if optimal tax rate, transfer and social insurance are
determined simultaneously. In that case, the lump-sum transferT would simply be smaller
by the former contribution ¹ p®D while all marginal conditions would be unchanged.
12The exact order between the labor supply decision and the purchase of insurance is not
relevant as long as individuals have perfect foresight and anticipate future choice options.Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance 8
in the social insurance contribution. To the contrary, the derivative with
respect to ¯ij does not take into account the change in the private insurance
premium. Where needed, the corresponding e￿ect that accounts for this
































The second equality follows directly from the results in the previous section.
Substituting L¤
ij back into the expected utility function yields the indirect
expected utility functionV ¤
ij(¿;T;®;¯ij;dij). Although the best contractIij is
chosen out of the set of available contracts, the functionV ¤
ij is not necessarily
an optimal value function with respect to(¯ij;dij) in the sense of the Envelope
theorem. This would be the case if insurance markets were perfect and
each individual would purchase full coverage at an actuarially fair premium.
Marginally fair variations in the contract would then not a￿ect V ¤
ij. With
adverse selection, however, individuals will not generally be able to purchase
such contracts.13
The insurance market equilibrium can be modelled using di￿erent equi-
librium concepts, some of which will be introduced in the next section. At
this point it is only necessary to emphasize that the equilibrium contracts
will depend on the policy P, i.e. that ¯ij = ¯ij(¿;T;®) and dij = dij(¯ij) =
dij(¿;T;®). Functions that account for equilibrium e￿ects are marked by two
asterisks. For labor supply this impliesL¤¤
ij (¿;T;®) = L¤
ij(¿;T;®;¯ij(¿;T;®);dij(¯ij)).
Indirect utility V ¤¤
ij (¿;T;®) is de￿ned analogously. E￿ects of the policy para-
meters on utility via the insurance market equilibrium may not be neglected,
with the argument given above for the functionV ¤
ij.
Assuming that there is no exogenous revenue requirement, government’s












ij ¡ T) = 0: (8)
13As before, the derivative of V ¤
ij with respect to ¯ij does not account for changes in the
premium dij if not indicated by A.Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance 9






















































where ° is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the revenue constraint.
It equals the welfare value of a marginal increase in government revenues.
Correspondingly, individual utility can be converted to units of revenue by
dividing through °.
In Appendix C the conditions (9)-(11) are transformed to make them
interpretable. We use three important concepts. The ￿rst is the net social













It captures the e￿ect of an increased transfer T on the objective via the
individual’s utility and via the e￿ect on the budget constraint through labor
supply changes, both measured in terms of government revenues.
In the presence of imperfect private insurance markets, government policy
has additional e￿ects on the objective via the insurance market equilibrium.
Therefore, the concept of net social marginal valuation of an individual’s






















As before, it captures the e￿ect of a changing insurance contract via utility
and via the budget constraint on the objective. Since (13) is formulated in
terms of premium-adjusted e￿ects, its sign and magnitude will depend on
the yet unde￿ned change in the private insurance premium.
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is used, where wn
i = (1 ¡ ¿)wi denotes the net wage, Lc
ij is the Hicksian





nonnegative elasticity of Lc
ij with respect to the net wage. The transformed
conditions for optimal government policy are14













































where ¹ y =
P
ij nijwiL¤
ij stands for average labor income and¹ b =
P
ij nijbij for
the population average of bij. Conditions (15)-(17) generalize the respective
conditions that were obtained by Cremer and Pestieau (1996) for the case
of perfect private insurance markets. They will be discussed in the next
subsections.
3.3 Optimal Transfer T
Consider condition (15). It di￿ers from the condition that Cremer and
Pestieau (1996) obtain for the case of perfect insurance markets only by
the last term
P
ij nijgij @¯ij=@T. This term actually drops out if insur-
ance markets are perfect. The individual contracts are then given byIij =
(1¡®;pj(1¡®)D) as everyone will buy full coverage for the remaining share
of the risk at an individually fair premium. These contracts are neither af-
fected by T nor by ¿. Condition (15) then states that the marginal gain from
increasing the transfer, measured in terms of revenue, should equal its cost.
In the case of imperfect insurance markets, increasing the transfer can
have additional e￿ects on the equilibrium contracts Iij that the individuals
can buy. Assume, for example, that a higher transfer increases ¯ij and dij
14These conditions are perfectly general with one exception. In deriving (17) we use the
assumption that the population average of @dij=@¯ij equals ¹ pD. This holds under most
insurance market equilibria, including those examined in section 4, but not necessarily in
equilibria in which some individuals do not purchase any insurance.Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance 11
for many individuals with a positive marginal valuation of insurance (gij >
0). Imperfect insurance markets then make a higher transfer T desirable
compared to a situation with perfect markets. To the contrary, if higher
insurance coverage leads to large reductions in labor supply and therefore
gij < 0, imperfect insurance markets weaken the case for high transfers.
3.4 Optimal Tax Rate ¿
With the same argument as above, if neither T nor ¿ have an e￿ect on
Iij, as for the case of perfect markets, condition (16) becomes the condition
obtained by Cremer and Pestieau (1996).15 It re￿ects the trade-o￿ between
e￿ciency and equity that is fundamental to the theory of optimal taxation.
The numerator re￿ects the goal of redistribution since the covariance between
income and marginal social valuation can be interpreted as a welfare-based
measure of inequality. A large negative correlation makes a higher tax rate
more desirable. The denominator captures the distorting e￿ect of taxation.
If labor supply reacts strongly to taxation (²ij large), optimal tax rates will
be smaller. If taxation did not cause distortions (²ij = 0), redistribution
should take place until the correlation between income and marginal social
valuation vanishes.
As before, the impact of taxation on the insurance market has to be
taken into account in a more general setup. The term
P
i;j nijgij(@¯ij=@¿ +
¹ y@¯ij=@T) captures these additional e￿ects. Put simply, it states that the tax
rate should be higher if it has a desirable impact on the insurance market, e.g.
by increasing the insurance coverage for people who have a positive social
marginal valuation of insurance. It is worth noting why this e￿ect enters (16)
as an (on average) compensated e￿ect, i.e. why we ￿nd the term ¹ y@¯ij=@T
in brackets. The overall e￿ect of ¿ on the market contracts is captured by
@¯ij=@¿. This e￿ect alone might make higher taxes desirable. The additional
revenue generated by a marginal increase in ¿ (¹ y) can be thought of as
the ‘negative cost’ of such government intervention and is captured by the
discussed term.
15Cremer and Pestieau (1996) derive the condition with only¿ on the LHS but de￿ne
the elasticity as ²ij = wi=L¤
ij £ @Lc
ij=@wn
i , such that their results is equivalent to ours.Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance 12
3.5 Optimal Social Insurance ®
At ￿rst glance, market imperfections should strengthen the case for social
insurance since it then alleviates additional e￿ciency problems. One of the
main points of our contribution is to show that this reasoning is not valid.
If insurance markets are perfect, condition (17) reduces to the respective
condition in Cremer and Pestieau (1996). Social insurance simply crowds out
private insurance (@¯ij=@® = ¡1) such that the term on the RHS becomes
zero. On the other hand, premiums are actuarially fair and (17) therefore
states that the covariance between damage probability and marginal social
valuation should be zero.16 It re￿ects that social insurance is a nondistorting
means of redistribution. High-risk types bene￿t from social insurance since
their private premiums would be larger than the social insurance contribu-
tion. The reverse holds for low-risk types, such that increasing® redistributes
from low to high risks and lowers the covariance between risk and marginal
social valuation. Government should do this until no correlation remains and
the potential of social insurance for redistribution is exhausted. 17 This condi-
tion was derived under the assumption of an interior solution. It will become
an inequality if the optimal ® is a corner solution (® = 1 if Cov(b;p) > 0
for all values of ® and vice versa). The optimal share of social insurance
will always be one if high productivity individuals are the ones with lower
damage probabilities (Cov(w;p) < 0), which is a reasonable case.18 With
full social insurance, individuals di￿er only with respect to their productiv-
ity, and high risk types will still have the higher marginal social valuation
due to their productivity disadvantage. An interior solution or ® = 0 can
only be optimal if productivity and risk are positively correlated. Without
social insurance, more productive individuals then have the disadvantage of
large private insurance premiums. If this e￿ect is small, it will not be su￿-
cient to induce a positive correlation between risk and social valuation and
there should be no social insurance. If the possible damage is large, the risk
disadvantage might exceed the productivity advantage and social insurance
16Strictly speaking, as the derivative of the private premium with respect to coverage
is pjD, the condition states that D times the covariance is equal to zero, which is also
obtained by Cremer and Pestieau.
17Note the analogy to the previous section where it was argued that a nonzero correlation
between social valuation and a variable that the government can (indirectly) condition its
policy on can only be optimal if the respective policy instrument causes distortions, which
is not the case here.
18See Henriet and Rochet (2004) for some empirical evidence.Imperfect Insurance Markets 13
will be desirable to redistribute from low to high productivity individuals.
As ® increases, the risk disadvantage becomes less important and an interior
solution is reached. The case constructed for such an interior solution is,
however, rather unrealistic, such that the model has serious problems with
explaining partial social insurance.
Now consider the general version (17) and assume as a starting point that
private insurance premiums are still adjusted actuarially fairly (@dij=@¯ij =
pjD). Even if the correlation between productivity and risk is negative and
the correlation between risk and social valuation therefore positive for all
values of ®, partial social insurance can be optimal if the RHS of (17) is
positive. It is positive if social insurance does increase insurance coverage
for individuals who have a large measure of prudence and react by strongly
reducing labor supply (gij < 0). Such labor market e￿ects weaken the ar-
gument for social insurance compared to situations with perfect insurance
markets.19 The fact that in the most general case it is the derivative of the
private premium with respect to the insurance coverage that matters in the
correlation in (17) illustrates the logic of redistribution via social insurance:
it is not damage probability per se but the comparison between private premi-
ums and social insurance contributions that determines the optimal amount
of social insurance.
4 Imperfect Insurance Markets
While the dependence of the insurance contractsIij on the policy parameters
P has been left unspeci￿ed in the previous section 3, we now proceed to show
how such relations emerge naturally from endogenizing the private insurance
market equilibrium. Most of the literature on social insurance as a means
of redistribution, notably the contributions of Rochet (1991), Cremer and
Pestieau (1996) and Henriet and Rochet (2004), is based on the premise of
perfect private insurance markets. In this case social insurance crowds out
private insurance, but there is no e￿ect of the tax parameters ¿ and T. In
19One could ask whether high labor supply in response to lack of insurance does not
itself constitute an ine￿ciency so that its reduction should increase welfare. The fact
that this is not true is a typical second-best result. Since taxation distorts labor supply
downwards, the opposite distortion through the imperfect insurance market is welfare
increasing. The reduction of precautionary labor through social insurance can then in
turn decrease welfare.Imperfect Insurance Markets 14
addition, the individuals’ choice of labor supply collapses to a deterministic
problem since all households are fully insured. This simpli￿es the analysis
considerably.
The assumption of e￿cient insurance markets is, however, based on an
informational inconsistency. Notably, it is hard to understand why insur-
ance companies are able to observe individual damage probabilities while
the government is not. Two arguments have been put forward to justify this
assumption. First of all, a similar informational asymmetry between the gov-
ernment and the private sector underlies the classical income tax model by
Mirrlees (1971), where ￿rms pay wages according to individual productivities
w whereas the government can only observe total incomewL.20 Analogously,
one may argue here that although insurers possess some information about
individuals, it is not possible for the government to collect it. A second justi-
￿cation goes back to Rochet (1991). In his view, the case for social insurance
as a redistributive instrument is strongest if private insurance markets are
taken as e￿cient. Otherwise, there would only be an additional e￿ciency
argument for the introduction of a social insurance system. 21
We will now examine the validity of this reasoning by assuming that
insurance companies have no information on individual riskspj, but that they
can observe the individual productivity levels wi.22 This allows us to divide
the private insurance market into W sub-markets, one for each productivity
level. For each of them we consider a simple adverse selection problem. As
is well known, imperfect insurance markets can be modelled using a variety
of game theoretic approaches that di￿er signi￿cantly in their positive and
normative implications.23 In the following, we aim at demonstrating how
20Rochet and Maderner (1995) have made this point and developed a model of taxation
where the government can observe w as do the ￿rms. However, in their model, w is
endogenized by a choice of education so that lump-sum taxation contingent onw is not
optimal.
21The same argument is used by Boadway, Leite-Monteiro, Marchand, and Pestieau
(2004) on p. 17.
22With this structure, there is still an asymmetry between government and insurers in
the sense that the latter can observe productivities whereas the former cannot. However, it
is not implausible that insurance companies face the same information set as the ￿rms on
the labor market. With our assumption, we at least eliminate any asymmetry within the
private sector. In addition, assuming that insurers cannot even observe productivities we
would face a bidimensional adverse selection problem which would excessively complicate
the analysis. The same informational assumption is taken by Boadway, Leite-Monteiro,
Marchand, and Pestieau (2004).
23See, for instance, Hellwig (1987) for an overview.Imperfect Insurance Markets 15
the optimality conditions for tax and social policy from section 3 can be
readily applied to very di￿erent equilibrium concepts as those developed by
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977).
A similar analysis has been performed by Boadway, Leite-Monteiro, Marc-
hand, and Pestieau (2004). However, they only consider Rothschild-Stiglitz
equilibria in the private insurance markets. One of our main results in this
section is that the e￿ects identi￿ed in this framework are not robust to alter-
native equilibrium concepts. In addition, our theory of precautionary labor
will prove extremely valuable in intuitively understanding all e￿ects of in-
come taxation and social insurance.
4.1 Adverse Selection with Endogenous Labor Supply
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the di￿erent equilibrium con-
cepts, some general comments on how to include adverse selection in our
model are necessary. In the standard models going back to Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977), only insurance coverage and premiums
are explained endogenously. In our model, labor supply is an additional en-
dogenous variable. While it has become clear in sections 2 and 3 that labor
supply reacts to the parameters of the insurance contract, the relationship
also works in the opposite direction: equilibrium insurance contracts cannot
be determined without accounting for variations in labor supply. The stan-
dard model of adverse selection therefore has to be extended by our theory
of precautionary labor. This gives rise to two main complications.
A crucial condition that needs to be ful￿lled to make adverse selection
problems tractable is the single-crossing property. It implies that the high
risk types are characterized by a steeper indi￿erence curve in the(¯ij;dij)-
space for every given combination of coverage and premium. Put formally,


























must be increasing in pj, where
c
0
ij ´ (1 ¡ ¿)wiL
¤
ij + T ¡ ¹ p®D ¡ dij ¡ (1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯ij)D and
c
1
ij ´ (1 ¡ ¿)wiL
¤
ij + T ¡ ¹ p®D ¡ dijImperfect Insurance Markets 16
stand for the consumption levels of individual ij in case of loss and no loss,
respectively. As can be seen from (18), this would clearly hold if labor supply
did not react to the damage probability pj. However, as shown in Appendix
D, a higher riskpj induces households to work more. The consumption of high
risk types will therefore be higher in both states of nature and their marginal
utilities of consumption consequently lower at each point in the (¯ij;dij)-
space. In the plausible case that preferences are characterized by a positive
measure of prudence, this may generate an opposite e￿ect on the marginal
rate of substitution (18). To make sure that the single-crossing property holds
globally, we therefore would have to assume either increasing risk aversion,
which is empirically unappealing, or that the direct e￿ect of the probabilities
dominates the indirect e￿ect via labor supply. It is demonstrated in the
Appendix that this is the case whenever the ratiopH=pL is su￿ciently high,
which we assume in the following.
A second issue that arises from the endogeneity of labor supply relates to
mimicking behavior. Any separating equilibrium involves a binding incentive
compatibility constraint in the sense that the contracts are such that one
type is indi￿erent between revealing his type and mimicking the other. In
the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium, for instance, this requires that the high
risks be indi￿erent between their full insurance contract and the low risks’
contract with less than full insurance but a premium that is more than fair
for them. In general, it will be optimal for the high risks to supply di￿erent
amounts of labor given the two insurance contracts. On the one hand, there
is a precautionary motive resulting from di￿erent levels of coverage while on
the other hand the premium di￿erence generates an income e￿ect.
We can use the results from section 2 to determine the direction of the
change in labor supply in case of mimicking. Suppose an individualij faces
two insurance contracts Iij = (¯ij;dij) and ~ Iij = (~ ¯ij; ~ dij) with ~ ¯ij < ¯ij,
between which it is indi￿erent. Then, due to risk aversion we must have
~ dij < dij. The two levels of optimal labor supply L¤
ij = L¤
ij(¿;T;®;¯ij;dij)
and ~ Lij = L¤
ij(¿;T;®; ~ ¯ij; ~ dij) are determined by condition (6). Clearly, weImperfect Insurance Markets 17
would obtain ~ Lij = L¤























ij + T ¡ p®D ¡ ~ dij
¢
: (19)
If (19) holds, the optimality condition for labor supply is not altered when
choosing ~ Iij instead of Iij.
In section 2 it turned out to be helpful to separate income and variance
e￿ects of a change in the coverage ¯ij before applying the de￿nitions of the
compensating and equivalent premiums (2) and (3). The di￿erence of the
expected damage between the two contracts is pj(¯ij ¡ ~ ¯ij)D. It is now
convenient to decompose the overall premium di￿erence as follows:
dij ¡ ~ dij ´ pj(¯ij ¡ ~ ¯ij)D + x: (20)
Hence, the total premium di￿erence consists of a fair part that compensates
the change in expected risk and a remaining unfair part denoted byx. With
this, we are able to apply the concept of the compensating precautionary
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ij + T ¡ p®D + ª
¤ ¡ x ¡ ~ dij
¢
: (21)
Comparing (21) with (19), we conclude that there is no change in labor sup-
ply if the compensating precautionary premium equals the unfair premium
di￿erence: ª¤ = x. In addition, given positive prudence and ~ ¯ij < ¯ij we
obtain that ~ Lij > L¤
ij if ª¤ > x and vice versa.24 This result is best under-
stood by going back to the intuition from section 2, where only changes in
24Using (3), we could equivalently state the result in terms of the equivalent precaution-
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variance were considered. Here, this is captured by the di￿erent shares of
insurance coverage while the only remaining additional income e￿ect is due
to the unfair part x of the insurance premium di￿erence. If it is positive, it
counteracts the precautionary motive.25 It just compensates it if it equals
the compensating precautionary premium.
We are also able to say something on the size of the e￿ects. For instance,
if the coe￿cient of prudence is su￿ciently high, then the compensating pre-
mium is high and we obtain ~ Lij > L¤
ij, i. e. the individual supplies more
labor in the more risky contract. The same holds if the unfair partx of the
premium di￿erence is su￿ciently small.
4.2 Rothschild-Stiglitz Separating Equilibrium
In this section we consider separating equilibria as suggested by Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976) in each of the W private insurance markets. Given a
productivity group i, a Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium is de￿ned as a set of
contracts Iij with the properties that all individuals choose the contract that
maximizes their utility, no contract in the set is associated with expected
losses and there exists no contract which, when o￿ered in addition to that
set, would earn strictly positive expected pro￿ts. As Rothschild and Stiglitz
have shown, such an equilibrium cannot be pooling in the sense that both
risk types choose the same contract. However, a separating equilibrium exists
if the share of high risks miH=mi is su￿ciently high which we shall assume
for all i.
The Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium consists of two contracts, one for the
high and one for the low risks. The high-risk types get their best contract





iH(¿;T;®;¯iH;diH) s.t. diH = pH¯iHD


















25In case of mimicking an individual with less insurance, we always must havex > 0.
This follows from the indi￿erence condition V ¤
ij(¿;T;®;dij;¯ij) = V ¤
ij(¿;T;®; ~ dij; ~ ¯ij) and
risk aversion. It implies that individual ij must be compensated for the lower coverage











































Figure 1: Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium (® = 0)
It is straightforward to show that the resulting contract is given by¯iH = 1¡®
and diH = pH(1 ¡ ®)D. Hence, the high risks get their ￿rst-best contract
with full insurance. The low risks’ equilibrium contract, by contrast, lies
on the low risks’ zero-pro￿t line and is such that the high risks’ incentive
compatibility constraint is just binding. Formally,¯iL solves
V
¤
iH(¿;T;®;1 ¡ ®;pH(1 ¡ ®)D) = V
¤
iH(¿;T;®;¯iL;pL¯iLD): (23)
The LHS of (23) indicates the utility the high risks derive from their own
contract. The incentive compatibility constraint requires that they cannot
do better by mimicking the low-risk types, i. e. by choosing the contract
(¯iL;pL¯iLD). Utility from mimicking is given by the RHS of (23) and shall
be denoted with the shortcut ~ ViH in the following. Clearly, the low risks are
underinsured. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium for the case® = 0.
The two conditions (22) and (23) allow us to simplify the optimality
conditions (15) to (17) from section 3. First of all, as all individuals pay an
actuarially fair premium, the premium adjusted e￿ect of insurance coverage
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which is a pure precautionary e￿ect. In addition, (24) completely vanishes


















Whereas this is again zero for the high risks because of (22), the low-risk
types derive positive utility from a marginal premium-compensated increase
in coverage. As can be seen in Figure 1, the slope of their indi￿erence curve














With these results, we are able to rewrite the net social marginal valuation





















giH = 0: (27)
There are two counteracting welfare e￿ects of variations in insurance coverage
for the low risks captured in (26). First, any actuarially fairly adjusted in-
crease in ¯iL is clearly welfare enhancing. Given positive prudence, however,
the reduced risk also induces them to supply less labor, which reduces income
tax revenue and therefore welfare.26 Hence, the sign of giL is generally am-
biguous and depends notably on the size of the coe￿cient of prudence. The
net social marginal valuation of insurance for the high-risk types is zero. This
is a direct implication of the fact that they obtain their ￿rst-best insurance
contract.
The comparative static e￿ects of the policy parameters on insurance cov-
erage remain to be discussed. This is the last step to close our model. We
demonstrate in the following subsections how the optimality conditions (15)
to (17) can be interpreted under the present equilibrium concept.
26Two similar e￿ects have been found by Boadway, Leite-Monteiro, Marchand, and
Pestieau (2004). Their ‘labour market e￿ciency term’ is hard to qualify and interpret,
however, as it is based on counteracting income e￿ects in the di￿erent states of nature.Imperfect Insurance Markets 21
4.2.1 Optimal Transfer T
The high-risk types’ equilibrium insurance coverage is ¯iH = 1 ¡ ® in the
Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibria, which of course implies@¯iH=@T = 0. Hence,
there are no e￿ects of the transfer on the high risks’ insurance. By contrast,
variations in T in general in￿uence the low risks’ insurance contracts as can





iH=@T ¡ @ ~ ViH=@T
@ ~ ViH=@¯ ¡ pLD@ ~ ViH=@T
: (28)
First, we can show that the denominator of (28) is positive. Indeed, (25) and









In signing the numerator of (28), it is helpful to make use of the ￿rst order
















iH denotes the high risks’ optimal labor supply in case they choose
the contract intended for them and ~ LiH stands for their optimal labor sup-
ply when they imitate the low risks. Due to the assumption of increasing
marginal disutility of labor, we obtain
@¯iL
@T
> 0 , ~ LiH > L
¤
iH:
An increased lump-sum transfer relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint
(23) if the high risks increase their labor supply when imitating the low risks
in the insurance market. This is the case if their preferences are characterized
by a high measure of prudence. Using our insights from section 4.1, we can
even derive a more explicit result. There we concluded that more labor is
supplied in the riskier contract if the compensated precautionary premium
exceeds the unfair premium di￿erence and vice versa. Transferring this to






< 0 , ª
¤ >
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< (pH ¡ pL)¯iLD:



























Compared to the standard result ¹ b = 1, (30) accounts for the additional
e￿ects caused by a marginally higher transfer T on the underinsured popu-
lation. If the precautionary labor motive is strong, the low risks get more
insurance coverage. On the one hand, this enhances welfare since underin-
surance is ine￿cient. However, as less labor is supplied, total welfare may
decrease, which is more likely the more prudent the households are. Our the-
ory of precautionary labor therefore proves crucial in determining whether
imperfect insurance markets justify a higher or lower lump-sum transfer com-
pared to the framework of Cremer and Pestieau (1996).
4.2.2 Optimal tax rate ¿
Again we ￿nd no e￿ect of tax policy on the high risks’ insurance contracts.






iH) ¡ @ ~ ViH=@T (¡wi~ LiH)
@ ~ ViH=@¯ ¡ pLD@ ~ ViH=@T
: (31)
Again, (31) has the opposite sign of its numerator. Substitution of the op-
timality conditions (29) and some rearrangements yield as condition for the









Due to concavity of v this is equivalent to
@¯iL
@¿
> 0 , ~ LiH < L
¤
iH: (32)
This reveals that the sign of @¯ij=@¿ will always be the opposite of the sign
of @¯ij=@T. It is therefore ambiguous how the additional e￿ects of taxation
on the insurance market a￿ect the ￿rst order condition for the optimal rateImperfect Insurance Markets 23
¿ compared to the result of Cremer and Pestieau (1996). Both cases in
which imperfect insurance markets call for higher and for lower tax rates are
imaginable.
4.2.3 Optimal Social Insurance ®
We now examine the case for social insurance in the presence of separating
equilibria. Clearly, as the high risks are always fully insured, social insurance
completely crowds out their private insurance: @¯iH=@® = ¡1. Hence, in
total there are again no e￿ects on the high risks insurance and the optimality











(33) indicates that two factors determine whether the argument for social in-
surance is reinforced compared to the results of Cremer and Pestieau (1996).
First, it depends on whether the low risks’ total insurance coverage is in-





@ ~ ViH=@¯ ¡
³
(pH ¡ ¹ p)@V ¤
iH=@T + ¹ p@ ~ ViH=@T
´
D
@ ~ ViH=@¯ ¡ pLD@ ~ ViH=@T
: (34)
The denominator is known from (28) where it was shown to be positive. In
addition, due to














Thus, a marginal increase in social insurance unambiguously mitigates the
ine￿ciency in the private insurance market. However, this does not imply
that the case for social insurance is reinforced. Inspection of (33) reveals
that the sign of giL is crucial as well. If households are very prudent, the
negative welfare e￿ect resulting from decreased labor supply dominates the
positive e￿ect from higher insurance coverage and giL is negative. It couldImperfect Insurance Markets 24
then even be optimal to completely renounce on the introduction of a social
insurance system despite the desired redistributive and e￿ciency impacts
in the insurance market. This result demonstrates that the argument put
forward by Rochet (1991) mentioned above is not valid. The desirability of
social insurance in the presence of perfect private insurance markets does not
imply its desirability given insurance market imperfections.
4.3 Wilson Pooling Equilibrium
In order to examine to what extent the results in the previous subsection 4.2
depend on the particularities of the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium concept,
we now consider an alternative notion of equilibrium going back to Wilson
(1977). To qualify as a Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium a set of contracts must
be such that no contract outside this set generates strictly positive expected
pro￿ts. This requirement is modi￿ed in the concept of Wilson (1977). Here,
there must not exist any contract outside the equilibrium set which would
earn strictly positive pro￿ts after the unpro￿table contracts in the original
set have been withdrawn. As was shown by Wilson (1977), if a Rothschild-
Stiglitz separating equilibrium exists, then it is also an equilibrium in the
sense of this modi￿ed notion. Otherwise, the Wilson concept allows for the
existence of a pooling equilibrium where both risk types choose the same
contract. We will consider this second case in the following.
Given a productivity groupi, the Wilson pooling equilibrium is such that
both risk types choose the low risks’ preferred contract on the zero pro￿t line





iL(¿;T;®;¯i;di) s. t. di = ¹ pi¯iD; (36)



















which, using the de￿nition of V ¤
iL, is equivalent to
pL(1 ¡ ¹ pi)u
0(c
0
iL) ¡ (1 ¡ pL)¹ piu
0(c
1
iL) = 0: (38)
As before, c0
iL and c1


























Figure 2: Wilson pooling equilibrium (® = 0)







pL(1 ¡ ¹ pi)
¹ pi(1 ¡ pL)
< 1
and thus ¯i < 1 ¡ ® for all i. We therefore ￿nd two fundamental di￿erences
to the properties of the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibria. First, all individuals
pay an individually unfair premium ¹ pi¯iD. This is because pooling equi-
libria involve cross-subsidization from low to high risks. Second, and more
importantly, the whole population is now underinsured. Figure 2 provides a
graphical illustration for the case ® = 0.




















Compared to (24), we ￿nd an additional income e￿ect from the unfair pre-
mium. In the Wilson equilibria, the high risks pay a premium which is more
than fair for them. Their labor supply is hence reduced given that leisure is
a normal good. Together with the negative precautionary e￿ect we ￿nd that
higher insurance coverage unambiguously reduces the high-risk types’ labor
supply. By an analogous argument, the e￿ect is in general undetermined forImperfect Insurance Markets 26
the low risks but also negative if they are su￿ciently prudent.
Similarly, the change in expected utility derived from a compensated vari-


















This vanishes for the low risks because of (37) and is positive for the high
risks due to the assumed single-crossing property. Thus, in a reversal of our
￿ndings based on the separating equilibria, only the high risks derive a direct
utility gain from increased coverage.
With these two insights, we can discuss the net social marginal valuation
of insurance gij for the two types. For the low risks, we are left with
giL = ¿wi
µ








which is the ambiguous labor supply distortion explained above. The high























Their net social marginal gain from insurance captures the two opposite ef-
fects on utility and labor supply and is therefore ambiguous as well. Yet, both
terms again crucially depend on the strength of the precautionary motive.
As in section 4.2, we are ￿nally able to close the model by considering
the comparative static e￿ects of the policy parameters on private insurance
coverage. A general comment on how to obtain these e￿ects is necessary.
Obviously, the dependence of ¯i on the policy variables can be determined
by di￿erentiating (37). This involves an additional complication compared
to our analysis in section 4.2 based on the incentive compatibility constraint
(23). There, the envelope theorem allowed us to ignore indirect e￿ects via
labor supply. This is no longer possible in the present framework since (37)
is not expressed in terms of levels of indirect utility, but of marginal rates of
substitution. These are in￿uenced by labor supply and hence the envelope
theorem does not apply. The need to account explicitly for all indirect e￿ects
through L¤
iL in di￿erentiating (37) will complicate our comparative static
analysis.Imperfect Insurance Markets 27
4.3.1 Optimal Transfer T




pL(1 ¡ ¹ pi)u00(c0










where SOC < 0 is the second order condition of (36). In case of positive
prudence, we have u00(c0
iL) < u00(c1
iH) < 0 but pL(1¡ ¹ pi) < ¹ pi(1¡pL), so that
even the ￿rst factor cannot be signed. However, with a strong precautionary
motive it is negative which extends to the whole e￿ect if the counteracting
indirect income e￿ect on labor supply is not dominating. Again assuming
that the prudence is su￿ciently high, the optimality condition (15) then calls
for a higher transfer compared to the standard result¹ b = 1 since it reduces
coverage and this is welfare enhancing under these circumstances.
4.3.2 Optimal Tax Rate ¿















where ²iL denotes the elasticity of the compensated labor supply with respect
to the net wage. The second term in brackets in (43) accounts for the e￿ect of
the labor distortion on the marginal rate of substitution of the low risks and
hence on equilibrium insurance coverage. In general this is nonzero as the
Envelope theorem does not apply. Its sign cannot be determined generally,
however, as the sign of its denominator is ambiguous. As for the case of a
Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium, market imperfections might call both for a
higher or a lower optimal tax rate ¿.
4.3.3 Optimal Social Insurance ®
The case for social insurance is considerably modi￿ed when pooling equilibria
in the private insurance market are considered. As becomes obvious from the
optimality condition
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a ￿rst di￿erence to (33) relates to the redistributive impact of social insur-
ance. Instead of Cov(bij;pj), we ￿nd the covariance between the net social
marginal valuation of income and the average damage probabilities in the
productivity groups. Clearly, social insurance is now no longer able to re-
distribute between high and low risks directly as this is already achieved by
cross-subsidization in the pooling equilibria. However, it is still possible to
redistribute across productivity classes as long as they are characterized by
di￿erent average risks and hence di￿erent private insurance premia. This is
captured in Cov(bij; ¹ pi).
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1 + (1 ¡ ¿)wi@L¤
iL=@T
: (45)
This expression again demonstrates that the indirect e￿ects on labor supply
are relevant and make the overall impact very complicated. We are now un-
able to rule out @¯i=@® < ¡1 and hence that an increase in social insurance
has a negative in￿uence on the e￿ciency of the insurance market. Such an
e￿ect would be favored by a su￿ciently high coe￿cient of prudence, implying
that the ￿rst factor in (42) is negative, and a strong negative income e￿ect
@L¤
iL=@T. In this case, the second term in (45) is negative (note that the ￿rst
one is always negative) and @¯i=@® < ¡1 is possible. This result weakens
the argument by Rochet (1991) mentioned above even more.
In sum, we ￿nd that the characterization of optimal taxes and social
insurance is highly sensitive to the underlying equilibrium concept. Many
e￿ects and their normative implications are modi￿ed when considering pool-
ing instead of separating equilibria. It is all the more encouraging to see
that our model framework is general and ￿exible enough to be easily applied
to these di￿erent approaches to the insurance market. We are even able to
include the possibility of a co-existence of pooling and separating equilibria
for di￿erent productivity groups. This could be the case with the Wilson
concept and the assumption that separating equilibria exist on some but not
all the W markets. We would then simply have to combine the e￿ects found
in sections 4.2 and 4.3 in our general optimality conditions.Conclusion 29
5 Conclusion
We have aimed at developing a theory of optimal taxation and social in-
surance in the presence of imperfect private insurance markets. While the
problem of taxation requires modelling the households’ choice of labor sup-
ply endogenously, ine￿cient insurance markets imply that they have to take
this decision under risk. Hence, a theory of labor supply under uncertainty
provides the basis for our analysis. As we have shown, there exists a motive
for precautionary labor supply under meaningful circumstances.
We then integrated this theory into a model of taxation and social in-
surance with imperfect insurance markets. This allowed us to show how the
optimality conditions based on e￿cient insurance markets have to be mod-
i￿ed. Notably, the strength of the precautionary labor e￿ect turned out to
be crucial in determining whether taxes or social insurance should be higher
or lower compared to the earlier results of Cremer and Pestieau (1996).
Considering speci￿c equilibrium concepts in the insurance markets, we
￿nally demonstrated the applicability of our model. We draw two main con-
clusions from this analysis. First, the positive and normative results are
highly sensitive to the equilibrium concept used. In particular, the redis-
tributive e￿ects of social insurance depend on whether separating or pooling
equilibria exist in the insurance market. Second, contrary to some arguments
found in the literature, the case for social insurance is not necessarily rein-
forced by the existence of insurance market imperfections. Social insurance
might even worsen the ine￿ciency of the insurance market and will have
welfare reducing e￿ects in the labor market.
Our paper has raised a variety of unexplored issues. A straightforward
extension of our model would be to allow for non-linear income taxation
and social insurance. However, we doubt that this would change the re-
sults signi￿cantly as the intuition for the redistributive e￿ects is independent
from the assumed linearity. Further questions relate to the theory of adverse
selection with endogenous labor supply that we have developed. What ad-
ditional interactions between ￿scal policy, private insurance and the labor
market could emerge? And how do standard results such as the possibility
of a Pareto-improving introduction of partial mandatory insurance need to
be modi￿ed if variable labor supply is accounted for? These issues remain to
be addressed by future research.Appendix 30
6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix A: Risk Aversion and Prudence
The Arrow-Pratt coe￿cient of absolute risk aversion for the consumption










[u0(c)]2 · 0: (47)
A necessary condition for this to be ful￿lled is that the numerator of (47) is
positive. For this in turn it is necessary that u000(c) is positive. Therefore,
whenever absolute risk aversion is constant or decreasing, the third derivative
of the utility function is positive and therefore the prudence is positive as well.
A negative u000(c) and therefore a negative prudence ´(c) = ¡u000(c)=u00(c) is
a su￿cient condition for increasing absolute risk aversion, which is not a
realistic assumption.









u0(c)[cu000(c) + u00(c)] ¡ c[u00(c)]2
[u0(c)]2 · 0: (49)
With the same argument as above this can only be ful￿lled if the numerator
is positive, which requires u000(c) to be positive. The argument therefore also
applies to relative risk aversion.
6.2 Appendix B: The Precautionary Premiums
Assume that a damage D, of which a share ¯ is insured (free of charge),
occurs with probability p. This de￿nes a Bernoulli random variable with
expectation p(1 ¡ ¯)D and variance ¾2(¯) = p(1 ¡ p)[(1 ¡ ¯)D]2.Appendix 31
The condition for optimal labor supply L¤(¯) is
w[pu
0(wL
¤ + T ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)D) + (1 ¡ p)u
0(wL
¤ + T)] = ¡v
0(L
¤): (50)




w[pu00(wL¤ + T ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)D) + (1 ¡ p)u00(wL¤ + T)]
SOC
; (51)
where SOC stands for the second derivative of the objective with respect to
L and is negative since the su￿cient condition for a maximum is ful￿lled.
Therefore, the income e￿ect is negative, which implies that leisure is a normal
good. This results from the assumption of separable utility.











The income e￿ect due to decreased expected damage is already visible as
the ￿rst term on the RHS of (52). Substituting ¢u00(¯) for u00(wL¤ + T) ¡
u00(wL¤ + T ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)D) and using the income e￿ect (51) and the fact that
the ￿rst derivative of the variance ¾2(¯) is given by
@¾2
@¯
= ¡2p(1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ ¯)D
2; (53)




























To see why (55) denotes the derivative ofª, consider a marginal variation of
¯ at ¯ close to 1 (full insurance). The ￿rst term on the RHS then becomes
the prudence ´ and (55) boils down to the derivative of (4) with respect to¯.
The ￿rst term on the RHS of (55) is therefore a generalized, secant version
of the prudence, applicable to situations with preexisting risk. It has theAppendix 32
sign of ¢u00(¯). This in turn is equal to the sign of u000 or the conventional
prudence, respectively, if these do not change their sign on the range between
wL¤ + T ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)D and wL¤ + T. In that case, the whole term @ª=@¯ is
negative if the prudence is positive, and vice versa.
One can apply the product rule for integration to (55) to obtain a gener-
alized version of (4) for the case of the described Bernoulli risk:
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In (56), ´(¯) represents the generalized prudence. Note that changes ofL¤(¯)
have to be taken into account when integrating. Still, the qualitative relation
between prudence and the premiumª remain the same even for large changes
in ¯.
6.3 Appendix C: The Optimal Policy


















The e￿ect of T on L¤¤
ij can be reduced to e￿ects on L¤
ij by explicitly taking




















The same decomposition can be applied toV ¤¤
ij and is of course also applica-
ble to the e￿ects of the other government parameters. Using this, as well as
the two concepts of marginal social valuation (bij and gij) de￿ned in section
3, the optimality condition (15) follows after some rearrangements.















Again, the e￿ects of ® on L¤¤
ij and V ¤¤
ij can be reduced to e￿ects on L¤
ij andAppendix 33
V ¤






















The ￿rst term on the LHS of (60) can further be transformed by noting that





















ij stands short for @dij=@¯ij. Equation (61) follows from the fact
the changes in social and private insurance di￿er only with respect to their
di￿erent premiums. The same decomposition holds for indirect utility. Sub-














ij ¡ ¹ pD) = 0: (62)
After adding and subtracting
P
i;j nij¹ b(d0



















ij ¡ ¹ pD) = 0:
(63)
The last term on the LHS of (63) is equal to zero since aggregate pro￿ts of
insurance companies in a competitive market equilibrium are zero. There-
fore, higher insurance coverage for all individuals will be accompanied by
adjustments in the premiums such that additional revenues equal additional
expected insurance payments on the population average. 27 The optimality
condition (17) now follows.




















27This holds under a vast majority of insurance market equilibria, among them those
discussed in section 4. However, cases are imaginable in which it is not be ful￿lled, for
example if insurance companies were only able to make price o￿ers and low risks would
not purchase any coverage. The optimality condition (17) is therefore not applicable to
such cases but a modi￿ed condition would have to be derived.Appendix 34


























ij = 0: (65)
Applying the Envelope theorem, the e￿ect of ¿ on V ¤
ij boils down to a pure
income e￿ect. The tax rate e￿ect on labor supply can be transformed using


























According to the ￿rst order condition (15) for the optimal transfer T, the
term ¹ b+
P
ij nijgij @¯ij=@T equals one and can therefore simply be multiplied
in the second sum in the numerator of (66). After some rearrangements, the
optimality condition (16) follows.
6.4 Appendix D: The Single-Crossing Property
By implicitly di￿erentiating the ￿rst order condition of the individual labor













because of risk aversion and the second order condition SOC < 0. Hence,
the high risk types supply more labor than the low risks at any given contract
with less than full insurance. To examine how this a￿ects the marginal rate




























Risk aversion implies u0(c1
ij) < u0(c0
ij). Hence, if we have u00(c0
ij) > u00(c1
ij)
(note that both are negative) then the sign of (68) is unambiguously positive.
This is saying that if the third derivative ofu is negative, then the high risksAppendix 35
always have the higher marginal rate of substitution because the indirect
e￿ect via labor supply runs in the same direction as the direct e￿ect. In this
case, the single-crossing property holds.
However, as shown in Appendix A, u000(:) < 0 is a su￿cient condition
for increasing risk aversion and therefore a rather implausible property of
preferences. Unfortunately, in the more realistic case of positive prudence
u000(:) > 0 the sign of (68) cannot be determined without further assumptions
since the indirect e￿ect of the higher risk via the increased labor supply may
decrease the marginal rate of substitution. In order to make sure that the
single-crossing property is ful￿lled we therefore need to assume that the direct
e￿ect dominates the indirect one. A su￿cient condition for this is that the
ratio pH=pL is high. To see this, divide the marginal rate of substitution (18)









iL) + (1 ¡ pL)u0(c1
iL)
pHu0(c0




Obviously, if pH approaches one andpL approaches zero, then the ratiopH=pL








which is strictly positive as the size of the labor adjustment can only be
￿nite.28 Hence, in this case, the direct e￿ect is always dominating and the
high risks have the steeper indi￿erence curves in the(¯ij;dij)-plane.
28To be more precise, the term is strictly positive as long the labor adjustment is such
that marginal utility from consumption does never become zero or in￿nity for any type.References 36
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